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Abstract 
 
Our research aims to analyze the causal relationships in 
the behavior of public debt issued by peripheral member 
countries of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), with special emphasis on the recent 
episodes of crisis triggered in the eurozone sovereign 
debt markets since 2009. With this goal in mind, we 
make use of a database of daily frequency of yields on 
10-year government bonds issued by five EMU 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), 
covering the entire history of the EMU from its 
inception on 1 January 1999 until 31 December 2010. In 
the first step, we explore the pair-wise causal 
relationship between yields, both for the whole sample 
and for changing subsamples of the data, in order to 
capture the possible time-varying causal relationship. 
This approach allows us to detect episodes of contagion 
between yields on bonds issued by different countries. 
In the second step, we study the determinants of these 
contagion episodes, analyzing the role played by 
different factors, paying special attention to instruments 
that capture the total national debt (domestic and 
foreign) in each country.  
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1. Introduction 
 
After the stability that characterized the first 10 years of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), the serious tensions that arose in international financial markets in August 2007 
due to the US subprime crisis, and the collapse of the financial institution Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008, sparked a global financial crisis that affected the real sector and caused a rapid, 
synchronized deterioration in most major economies. The economic and financial crisis 
highlighted the imbalances within the euro area which had probably been undervalued during the 
previous years of stability. It was as if the sovereign debt markets had underestimated the 
possibility that governments might default.  
 
From August 2007 onwards, yield spreads of euro area issues with respect to Germany spiraled 
in parallel with the rise in global financial instability that led to the “flight-to-quality”, resulting in a 
transfer of funds towards assets with a lower risk (the German bund) and an increase of the risk 
premium in the other EMU countries (see Figure 1). Therefore, in only four years the EMU bond 
markets went from a situation of stability and tranquility to their current situation of turmoil.  
 
With the rescues of Greece and Ireland in 2010 and of Portugal and Greece again in 2011, it 
seems increasingly clear that the origin of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe goes beyond the 
imbalances in public finances. The interconnection between the private and public debt is 
obvious. In fact, while the ratio of public debt in the euro area dropped from 66% in 2003 to 63% 
in 2007, household debt increased from 41% to 56% of GDP during the same period and financial 
institutions increased their debt levels from 126% of GDP to close to 200%2.  
 
Indeed, the main causes of the debt crises in Europe vary according to country. In Ireland, the 
crisis was mainly due to the private sector, particularly a domestic housing boom which was 
financed by foreign borrowers who did not require a risk premium related to the probability of 
default (see Lane, 2011). In Spain, since absorption exceeded production, the external debt grew 
and the real exchange rate appreciated, implying a loss of competitiveness for the economy. 
Unlike previous expansions, the resort to financing was not led by the public sector but by private 
households and firms. The average value of the debt-to-GDP ratio during the period 2007-2010 in 
Spain surpassed 80% in the public sector and was close to 90% in the private. 
 
                                                 
2 As we explain in Sub-section 3.2, private debt data have been compiled using the Monetary Financial 
Institutions (MFI) balance sheet statistics provided for each country by the European Central Bank (see 
Table 6). 
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In contrast to Ireland and Spain, the origin of the debt crisis in Greece and Portugal was the 
structural deficit in the government sector. If the crisis finally spreads to Italy, this structural deficit 
would be the possible cause.  Greece and Italy’s large fiscal deficit and huge public debt are the 
cumulative result of chronic macroeconomic imbalances3. However, the case of Portugal 
illustrates the importance of foreign debt. Portugal’s debt-to-GDP ratio (63% at the end of 
December 2010) was much lower than Belgium’s (123%), but whilst the latter is a net creditor 
towards the rest of the world, the markets are worried about Portuguese high external debt4 
(specifically, that of its private sector: banks and enterprises).  
 
Some studies have found a strong relationship between risk premium and a wide range of 
vulnerability indicators that cover not only the fiscal position, but also (1) the current account 
balance and the net position towards the rest of the world, (2) the reliance on external funding to 
finance a domestic expansion, (3) the appreciation of the real exchange rate and the loss of 
competitiveness and (4) the cross-border banking system linkages to the government sector, 
among other things.  
 
The IMF (2010) and Barrios et al. (2009) present empirical evidence of the strong relationship 
between current account deficits and foreign debt and the behavior of sovereign risk premium. 
Moreover, Gros (2011) contends that foreign debt is more important than public debt, and that this 
may have a number of implications for the ongoing eurozone crisis5.  
 
Other authors (Bolton and Jeanne (2011), Allen et al. (2011)), have focused on the study of cross-
border banking system linkages to the government sector. Cross-border banking brings important 
stability benefits, but it also brings costs. Its effect on risk diversification is a key benefit. Since the 
assets of cross-border banks will be less exposed to country-specific shocks, they are less likely 
to have to constrain their lending or to fail to honor their debts. Therefore, the presence of foreign 
banks in a country is likely to enhance the stability and efficiency of the economy. 
 
On the side of costs, foreign capital is likely to be more mobile than domestic capital. In a crisis 
situation, foreign banks may simply decide to “cut and run”. In addition, the increase in cross-
border banking activity will also tend to increase the complexity, interconnectedness, and size of 
                                                 
3 As pointed out in Gómez-Puig (2006 and 2008), in the past, Italy may have benefited from the fact that 
“size matters for liquidity” and thus for the success of a sovereign debt market since at the end of 2010 its 
market was the biggest in the euro area.  
4 The current account deficit over GDP was 9.86% in December 2010. 
5 This author points out that the importance of external debt is due to the fact that euro area governments 
retain full sovereignty over the taxation of their citizens, but they are bound by existing treaties and 
international norms and do not have a free hand in taxing non-citizens. Therefore, euro countries can 
always service their domestic debt, even without access to the printing press, but not their external debt.    
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the institutions. Since cross-border banks are more likely to be systemically relevant, their failure 
may impose significantly higher costs for economies than the failure of a purely domestic bank.  
 
Another important destabilizing force is contagion: just as cross-border banking insulates the 
domestic economy from domestic shocks; it also exposes it to foreign ones. Moreover, since there 
are several channels linking the banking sector and the sovereign debt market, financial or 
sovereign crisis in a country can quickly spill over to other countries through an integrated banking 
system. All in all, the stability benefits from cross-border banking may outweigh the costs, 
provided its volume is not excessive. 
 
The European Union and, especially the euro area, witnessed a significant increase in cross-
border financial activity over the 10 years before the global crisis (see Barnes, Lane and Radziwill, 
2010). Both the elimination of currency risk and regulatory convergence6 can explain the 
important increase in cross-border financial activity in the EMU (see Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou 
and Peydró-Alcalde, 2009). Spiegel (2009a) shows that the relative increase in bilateral bank 
claims involving euro area members can be attributed to three different channels: (a) a “borrower” 
effect, by which euro membership increases creditworthiness, (b) a “creditor” effect, which 
increases the attractiveness of a member country’s banks as financial intermediaries, and (c) a 
“pair-wise” effect such that joint membership of the euro increases the quality of intermediation 
when both lender and borrower are in the monetary union.  
 
Spiegel (2009a) not only finds evidence that the pair-wise effect is the dominant one, but also that 
it is strongest for those country pairs that also have high levels of bilateral trade. Moreover, 
Spiegel (2009b) shows that the effect of the euro has been even stronger for some of the 
peripheral EMU countries. In particular, the sources of external financing for Portuguese and 
Greek banks radically shifted on joining the euro; traditionally reliant on dollar debt, these banks 
were subsequently able to raise funds from their counterparts elsewhere in the EMU. 
 
In this scenario of increased cross-border financial activity in the euro area, Gray et al. (2008) 
points out the importance of identifying the channels of contagion between the banking and the 
sovereign sectors, not only within a country but across countries as well. On the one hand, a 
systemic banking crisis can induce a contraction of the entire economy, weakening public 
finances and thus transferring the distress to the government. This contagion effect is amplified 
when the financial sector has state guarantees. As a feedback effect, risk is further transmitted to 
                                                 
6 The introduction of the Single Banking License in 1989 through the Second Banking Directive was a 
decisive step towards a unified European financial market, which subsequently led to a convergence in 
financial legislation and regulation across member countries. 
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holders of sovereign debt. On the other hand, macroeconomic imbalances in a specific country 
lead to rising sovereign spreads and a devaluation of the government debt that is mirrored in 
banks’ balance sheets. In addition, sovereign or financial crisis in a country can quickly spill over 
to other countries through an integrated banking system.  
 
The recent literature on sovereign debt has generally ignored these linkages. But, as the recent 
European sovereign debt crisis has highlighted, contagion of the crisis in one country to others 
through the banking system can be a major issue. Only a handful of recent papers have 
addressed the interaction between sovereign default and the stability of the domestic financial 
system. The analyses by Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2010), Broner, Martin and Ventura (2010), 
Mody (2009) and Ejsing and Lemke (2009) are among them7.  
 
The papers most closely related to our analysis are the studies by Bolton and Jeanne (2011), 
Andenmatten and Brill (2011) and Sosvilla-Rivero and Morales-Zumaquero (2011). Bolton and 
Jeanne (2011) analyze contagious sovereign debt crises in financially integrated economies. 
Under financial integration, banks optimally diversify their holdings of sovereign debt in an effort to 
minimize costs with respect to an individual country’s sovereign debt default and to guarantee 
their access to public liquidity (in return for lending to private banks, central banks generally 
require collateral in the form of government and other highly rated securities)8. The central issue 
in their paper is the international contagion caused by the banks’ exposure to the sovereign risk of 
foreign countries. Using data from the 2010 European stress test, they show that financial 
integration without fiscal integration results in an inefficient equilibrium supply of government 
debt9.  
 
Andenmatten and Brill (2011) perform a bivariate test for contagion that is based on an approach 
proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) to examine whether the co-movement of sovereign CDS 
premium increased significantly after the beginning of the Greek debt crisis in October 2009. 
                                                 
7 Beakert et al. (2011) analyze the transmission of crises to country-industry equity portfolios in 55 
countries, using the 2007-2009 financial crisis as a laboratory. 
8 This latter reason may have played a particularly important role in the euro area and may explain 
why there has been substantially faster financial integration among euro member countries than 
elsewhere, as De Santis and Gerard (2006) have highlighted.   
9The same conclusion is reached by Gros and Mayer (2011) who say that “The EU resembles a group of 
highly interdependent companies with large cross-holdings of equity stakes. However, the formal structure 
of the group is very light. There is no central authority that can give orders to individual members of the 
group”. They conclude that the euro area can no longer avoid a stark choice: “either it sticks to the limited 
liability character of EMU (but in this case sovereign default becomes likely), or it moves towards a fiscal 
union with a mutual guarantee for the public debt of all member countries”.  
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Unlike Forbes and Rigobon, they conclude that in European countries “both contagion and 
interdependence” occurred.  
  
In the first stage of their study, Sosvilla-Rivero and Morales-Zumaquero (2011) examine the 
behavior of daily yields for 11 EMU countries during the 2001-2010 period, decomposing volatility 
into permanent and transitory components. In the second stage, they test for correlation and 
causality, detecting the existence of two different groups of countries – closely-linked, core EMU 
countries and peripheral EMU countries – whose existence is validated using a cluster analysis. 
 
However, an important constraint in the above-mentioned empirical evidence is the fact that it 
ignores the dynamic component of the degree of contagion of the public debt markets. In this 
regard, Abad, Chuliá and Gómez-Puig (2010 and 2011) examine the European government bond 
market integration from a dynamic perspective, applying an asset pricing model to a dataset 
spanning the years 2004 to 2009. Their results suggest that, from the beginning of the financial 
market tensions in August 2007, markets moved towards higher segmentation, and the 
differentiation of country risk factors increased substantially across countries10. Nonetheless, the 
evolution of the time-varying degree of causality and contagion between different EMU public debt 
markets has not yet been analyzed in sufficient depth by the literature. This paper aims to carry 
out an analysis of this kind.  
 
Thus, the main objectives of this paper are: (1) to test for the existence of possible causal 
relationships between the evolution of the yield of peripheral EMU countries’ issues, (2) to 
examine the time-varying nature of these causal relationships and to detect episodes of contagion 
between them, and (3) to analyze the determinants of these contagion events considering not 
only macroeconomic imbalances and banking linkages, but also indicators of investor sentiment. 
This paper also makes three main contributions to the existing literature. First, it presents a 
dynamic approach to the analysis of the evolution of the degree of causality and contagion 
between different EMU public debt markets. Second, it makes use of a unique dataset on private 
debt-to-GDP by sector (households, banks and non-financial corporations) in each EMU country, 
built up by the authors using the Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) balance sheet statistics 
provided for each euro country by the European Central Bank. Besides, cross-border banking 
linkages are measured using the consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis of Bank for 
International Settlements reporting banks in the public, the banking and the non-financial private 
                                                 
10 Although the levels were very low, the persistence of positive yield spreads against Germany detected 
before the beginning of the crisis (see Gómez-Puig, 2009a and 2009b) was still a reflection of incomplete 
integration in EMU bond markets. 
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sectors, as a proportion of GDP. Third, it focuses the analysis on peripheral EMU countries 
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), since these are the countries which have come under 
fire in the markets since 2009, reflecting investors’ perceptions of risks, and which to a large 
extent have been the cause of the current sovereign debt crisis in the whole eurozone.  
 
The most important results of the analysis can be summarized as follows. Firstly, they provide 
empirical evidence of the existence of sub-periods of Granger causality in all pair-wise 
relationships. Given the absence of consensus about the definition of contagion, we identify 
contagion episodes as sub-periods of significant increase in causality.  So, the results suggest 
that these episodes are concentrated around the first year of the EMU in 1999, the introduction of 
euro coins and banknotes in 2002, and the global financial crisis in the late-2000s. Moreover, they 
also indicate that the causality relationships between peripheral EMU yields have significantly 
risen during the recent crises in sovereign debt markets from 2009, providing evidence of an 
increase in the contagion between them. 
 
Secondly, the results of the probit models estimated to analyze the determinants of the contagion 
episodes show that in all cases the variable that captures cross-border banking linkages is 
statistically significant. This finding suggests that, in a scenario of increased international financial 
activity in the euro area, contagion of the crisis in one country to other countries through the 
banking system can be a major issue. Nevertheless, the instruments we have used to capture 
macroeconomic imbalances in the different countries also indicate that these imbalances are key 
determinants of the probability of occurrence of a contagion episode. Lastly, regarding the role of 
private debt, we find evidence supporting its importance in the cases of Spain and Italy and we 
detect a relevant effect of foreign bank claims on banking and non-financial private sector debt-to-
GDP on the probability of contagion from Ireland.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the causality analysis and our 
approach for the detection of contagion episodes. In Section 3 we carry out the exploration of the 
determinants of these contagion events. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the findings and offers 
some concluding remarks.  
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2. Causality and contagion 
2. 1. Econometric methodology 
 
Granger’s causality test is widely used to test for the relationship between two variables. 
However, causality tests are sensitive to lag length and, therefore, it is important that the lengths 
selected should be the right ones; otherwise, the model estimates will be inconsistent and 
misleading inferences may be drawn (see, Thornton and Batten, 1985). In this paper, we use 
Hsiao’s (1981) generalization of the Granger notion of causality. Hsiao proposed a sequential 
method to test for causality, which combines Akaike’s final predictive error (FPE, from now on) 
and the definition of Granger causality. Essentially, the FPE criterion trades off bias that arises 
from under-parameterization of a model against a loss in efficiency resulting from over-
parameterization of the model.  
 
Consider the following models,  
 t 0
1
m
i t i t
i
X X  

   
j t
                  (1) 
 0
1 1
m n
t i t i j t
i j
X X Y   
 
     
                                                
                  (2)       
 
where Xt and Yt  are stationary variables [i.e., they are I(0) variables]. The following steps are 
used to apply Hsiao’s procedure for testing causality: 
 
i) Treat Xt as a one-dimensional autoregressive process (1), and compute its FPE with 
the order of lags m varying from 1 to m11. Choose the order which yields the smallest 
FPE, say m, and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX (m, 0). 
ii) Treat Xt as a controlled variable with m number of lags, and treat Yt as a manipulated 
variable as in (2). Compute again the FPE of (2) by varying the order of lags of Yt from 
 
11 FPEX(m,0)  is computed using the formula: 1( ,0) · ,
1X
T m SSRFPE m
T m T
    where T is the total number of 
observations and SSR is the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (1) 
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1 to n, and determine the order which gives the smallest FPE, say n, and denote the 
corresponding FPE as FPEX (m,n)12. 
iii) Compare FPEX (m, 0) with FPEX (m,n) [i.e., compare the smallest FPE in step (i) with 
the smallest FPE in step (ii)]. If FPEX (m,0) > FPEX (m,n), then Yt is said to cause Xt. If 
FPEX (m,0) < FPEX (m,n), then Xt is an independent process. 
iv) Repeat steps i) to iii) for the Yt variable, treating Xt as the manipulated variable. 
 
When Xt and Yt are not stationary variables, but are first-difference stationary [i.e., they are I(1) 
variables] and cointegrated (see Dolado et al., 1990), it is possible to investigate the causal 
relationships from ∆Xt to ∆Yt and from ∆Yt to ∆Xt, using the following error correction models: 
i t
 
0 1
1
m
t t i t
i
X Z X   

      
j t
                  (3) 
               0 1
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t
i j
X Z X Y    
 
         
t
               (4) 
 
where Zt is the OLS residual of the cointegrating regression ( tX Y   ), known as the error-
correction term. Note that, if Xt and Yt are I (1) variables, but they are not cointegrated, then β in 
(3) and (4) is assumed to be equal to zero. 
 
In both cases [i.e., Xt  and Yt  are I(1) variables, and they are or are not cointegrated], we can use 
Hsiao’s sequential procedure substituting Xt with ∆Xt and Yt with ∆Yt in steps i) to iv), as well as 
substituting expressions (1) and (2) with equations (3) and (4). 
 
 
2. 2. Data 
 
We use daily data of 10-year bond yields from 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2010 collected 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream for EMU peripheral countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain. 
 
                                                 
12 FPEX(m,n)  is computed using the formula: 1( , ) · ,
1X
T m n SSRFPE m n
T m n T
      where T is the total number of 
observations and SSR is the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (2) 
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Figures 1a and 1b plot the daily 10-year sovereign bond yield and the spread against the bund for 
each country in our sample. A simple look at these figures indicates the differences in the yield 
behavior before and after the financial crisis of 2008.  
 
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b here] 
 
Specifically, after the introduction of the euro in January 1999 and until the subprime crisis in 
global financial markets in August 2007, spreads on bonds of eurozone members moved in a 
narrow range with only slight differentiation across countries. In fact, the stability and convergence 
of spreads was considered a hallmark of successful financial integration inside the euro area. 
Nevertheless, after the subprime crisis in 2007 severe tensions emerged in financial markets 
worldwide, including the EMU bond market. Following the collapse of the US financial institution 
Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, the financial turmoil turned into a global financial crisis 
which began to spread to the real sector.  
 
At the same time, the financial crisis showed that imbalances within euro countries still persisted, 
since interest rate differentials between government bond issues of participating countries, which 
had reached levels close to zero between 2003 and 2007 (the average value of the 10-year yield 
spread against the German bund moved between -4 and 20 basis points, in the case of Ireland 
and Greece, respectively), now reemerged. In fact, the risk premium on EMU government bonds, 
which had followed a secular downward trend in the past, increased strongly in 2008, reflecting 
investor perceptions of upcoming risks; by the end of December 2010 it reached levels of 952 
basis points in Greece, 580 in Ireland, 380 in Portugal, 255 in Spain and 182 in Italy.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the levels and differences of the 10-year government’s 
yield in the above-mentioned EMU countries during the sample period (1999-2010). As can be 
seen, the mean is not significantly different from zero for the first differences. Normality is tested 
with the Jarque-Bera test (which is distributed as χ2(2) under the null) and strongly rejected for 
both the levels and first differences. Since rejection could be due to either excess of kurtosis or 
skewness, we report these statistics separately in Table 1. Given that the kurtosis of the normal 
distribution is 3, our results suggest that the distribution of the yields of Greece and Ireland, as 
well as all the first differences, are peaked relative to the normal, while the distribution of the 
yields in the cases of Italy, Portugal and Spain are flat relative to the normal. Finally, regarding the 
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asymmetry of the distribution of the series around their mean, we find positive skewness for all the 
variables in levels and for the first difference in the case of Italy, suggesting that their distributions 
have long right tails, while in the cases of the first differences of yields for Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain there is evidence of negative skewness and therefore distributions with long 
left tails. 
 
 
2.3. Preliminary results 
 
As a first step, we tested for the order of integration of the 10-year bond yields by means of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The results, shown in Table 2, decisively reject the null 
hypothesis of nonstationarity, suggesting that both variables can be treated as first-difference 
stationary.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Following Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2001)’s suggestion, we confirm this result using the 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) tests (KPSS), where the null is a stationary process against the 
alternative of a unit root. As can be seen in Table 3, the results fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
stationarity in first differences, but strongly reject it in levels. 
 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
As a second step, we tested for cointegration between each of the 10 pair combinations13 of 
peripheral EMU yields using Johansen (1991, 1995)’s approach. An important decision in this 
approach is whether to include deterministic terms in the cointegrating VAR. Deterministic terms, 
such as the intercept, linear trend, and indicator variables, play a crucial role in both data behavior 
and limiting distributions of estimators and tests in integrated processes. Results in Banerjee et al. 
(1993), Johansen (1994) and Nielsen and Rahbek (2000) show the statistical properties of the 
commonly used test, indicating that in some cases its size cannot be controlled, and in others 
there is substantial power loss. Depending on their presence or absence, the system may 
manifest drift, linear trends in cointegration vectors, or even quadratic trends. In practical work, 
                                                 
13 Recall that the number of possible pairs between our sample of five peripheral EMU yields is given by the 
following formula ! 5! 10.
!( )! 2!(5 2)!
n
r n r
  
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there seem to be only two relevant model representations for the analysis of cointegration 
amongst most economic time series variables:   
i. the level data have no deterministic trend and the cointegrating equations have 
intercepts; and  
ii. the level and the cointegrating equations have linear trends.  
 
Table 1 shows that the hypothesis of the expected values of the first differences of the series is 
equal to zero can not be rejected; hence, there is no evidence of linear deterministic trends in the 
data. The graphs in Figure 1a support this conclusion. Therefore, we conclude that the 
cointegrated VAR model should be formulated according to i), with the constant term restricted to 
the cointegration space, and no deterministic trend terms. This implies that some equilibrium 
means are different from zero.  
 
As can be seen in Table 4, only for the Greece-Ireland and Greece-Portugal cases does the trace 
test indicate the existence of one cointegrating equation at (at least) the 0.05 level. Therefore, for 
these two pairs we test for Granger-causality in first differences of the variables, with an error-
correction term added [i. e., equations (3) and (4)], whereas for the remaining cases, we test for 
Granger-causality in first differences of the variables, with no error-correction term added [i. e., 
equations (3) and (4) with β=0] 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
2.4. Whole sample results 
The resulting FPE statistics for the whole sample are reported in Table 5.14 
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
 
As can be seen, in most of the cases our results suggest bidirectional Granger causality. We do 
not find unidirectional Granger causality relationships running from Greece to Spain or from 
Portugal to Ireland.  
                                                 
14 These results were confirmed using both Wald statistics to test the joint hypothesis 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ... 0n       in 
equation (4) and Williams-Kloot test for forecasting accuracy (Williams, 1959). These additional results are 
not shown here to save space, but they are available from the authors upon request.  
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Note that, even though the results of the cointegration tests reject (with only two exceptions) a 
long-run relationship between them, we find evidence of strong causal linkages between 
peripheral EMU yields. Therefore, each yield series contains useful information that is not present 
in the others which can help to explain the others’ short-run evolution. This finding may indicate 
that peripheral EMU countries are considered by market participants as a group, confirming 
earlier evidence of market segmentation between core and peripheral EMU countries (see, e.g., 
Sosvilla-Rivero and Morales-Zumaquero, 2011). 
 
 
2.5. Rolling regression results 
  
In this sub-section, we use rolling analysis to gain further insights into the dynamic causality 
between the 10 possible relationships in peripheral EMU yields. Specifically, we report the results 
of estimates from a sequence of short rolling samples to track a possibly time-varying relationship. 
We carry out 33,486 regressions using a window of 200 observations15. In each estimation, we 
apply Hsiao (1981)’s sequential procedure outlined above to determine the optimum FPE (m, 0) 
and FPE (m, n) statistics in each case.  
 
A graphic presentation of the evolution of the difference between FPE (m, 0) and FPE (m, n) 
statistics in each case is shown in Figure 2. These graphs provide us with a view of the dynamic 
influence of each EMU peripheral yield over the other four and constitute our indicator of time-
varying causality. Adopting a forward-looking framework, we assign the computed indicator to the 
first date used in the rolling regressions. Therefore, the sample covers the period 1 January 1999 
to 26 March 2010 in all cases, except in those pairs where Greece is present, in which case the 
sample runs from 1 January 2001 to 26 March 2010. Note that if the difference is positive in the 
case XX → YY, this indicates the existence of a statistically significant Granger causality 
relationship running from country XX towards country YY.  
 
As can be seen, we find sub-periods of Granger causality in all pair-wise relationships, including 
those running from Greece to Spain and from Portugal to Ireland, even though these relationships 
were rejected in the whole sample tests.  
 
Given that there is no consensus on exactly what constitutes contagion or how it should be 
defined, in our analysis we define contagion episodes in a restrictive way as sub-periods of 
significant increase in causality. As a rule of the thumb, we identify such sub-periods of intense 
                                                 
15 To the best of our knowledge, there is no statistical method to set the optimal window size. The chosen 
value of 200 observations is representative of the one used in practice and seems appropriate for our 
empirical application since it represents 6.36% of the sample. 
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causality as those in which the time-varying causality indicator is greater than its average plus two 
standard errors16. 
 
The graphs in Figure 2 suggest that the contagion episodes are concentrated around the first year 
of the existence of the EMU in 1999, the introduction of euro coins and banknotes in 2002, and 
the global financial crisis of the late-2000s. As can be seen, the graphs also indicate that the 
causality relationships between peripheral EMU yields increased significantly during the recent 
crises in sovereign debt markets since 2009, providing evidence of a strengthening in the 
contagion between them. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
3. Determinants of contagion 
 
3.1. Econometric methodology 
We use probit models to analyze the determinants of the contagion episodes we have detected. 
In our case, we define a new dependent variable (y) that takes the value one if we have detected 
contagion and zero otherwise. The goal is to quantify the relationship between a set of 
instruments (X) characterizing the country issuing a given bond and the probability of contagion 
(y). 
 
To this end, we adopt a specification designed to handle the particular requirements of binary 
dependent variables. Suppose that we model the probability of observing a value of one as: 
                  Pr (y = 1| X, β) = 1 – (–X’ β) =   (X’ β)                      (5) 
where is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. As can be 
seen, we adopt the standard simplifying convention of assuming that the index specification is 
linear in the parameters so that it takes the form X’β. 

 
                                                 
16 We perform formal tests to evaluate whether the series have the same mean during the contagion 
episodes detected and the rest of the observations. The results of these tests (not shown here, but 
available from the authors upon request) strongly reject the null hypothesis of .equal mean across sub-
samples, and provide strong evidence of the presence of increased causality. 
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3.2. Instruments to model the time-varying contagion 
According to Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000), reasons for contagion can be divided into 
two groups: fundamental-based reasons on the one hand, and investor behavior-based reasons 
on the other. While fundamental-based contagion works through real and financial linkages 
across countries, behavior-based contagion is more sentiment-driven. 
 
In our analysis we will use instruments that capture both kinds of reasons. Following the literature 
(the IMF (2010), Barrios et al. (2009), Mody (2009) and Bolton and Jeanne (2011) among others), 
in order to measure fundamental reasons of contagion we not only use instruments that gauge the 
country’s fiscal position but also instruments that assess the foreign debt, the country’s potential 
rate of growth, the loss of competitiveness, the private sector indebtedness and the cross-border 
banking system linkages. Specifically, 
 
i) The government debt-to-GDP (GOVDEB) and the government deficit-to-GDP (DEF) 
are the variables used to measure the country’s fiscal position. These two variables 
have been widely used in the literature by other authors (see, e.g., Bayoumi et al., 
1995) and present the advantage over the credit rating that they cannot be considered 
ex post measures of fiscal sustainability. They are compiled from Eurostat, and 
monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly observations. 
ii) The current-account-balance-to-GDP ratio (CAC) is the instrument used as a proxy of 
the foreign debt and the net position of the country towards the rest of the world. The 
importance of this variable has been underlined by the IMF (2010) and Barrios et al. 
(2009). This variable is drawn from the OECD and monthly data are linearly 
interpolated from quarterly observations. 
 
In view of Mody (2009)’s argument that countries’ sensitivity to the financial crisis is more 
pronounced the greater the loss of growth potential and competitiveness, we include instruments 
that measure these features.  
  
iii) The leading indicator (LEA), the GDP rate of growth (GRO) and the unemployment 
rate (U) are the variables used to capture the country’s growth potential. The leading 
indicator is obtained from the OECD on a monthly basis, whilst the unemployment rate 
and the GDP rate of growth are collected from Eurostat (in the latter case, monthly 
data are interpolated from quarterly observations).  
iv) The Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices monthly rate of growth is the inflation rate 
measure (INF) we use in our analysis as a proxy of the appreciation of the real 
 17
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exchange rate and, thus, the country’s loss of competitiveness. It is taken from 
Eurostat.  
 
As we outlined in the introduction, the origin of sovereign debt crisis in Europe goes beyond the 
imbalances in public finances. In some countries, such as Ireland, the crisis was mainly due to the 
private sector, particularly the domestic housing boom which was financed by foreign borrowing 
(see Lane, 2011). For this reason we also incorporate instruments that capture the indebtedness 
of each country’s private sector in the analysis. 
 
v) These variables are: Banks’ debt-to-GDP (BANDEB), non-financial corporations’ debt-
to-GDP (NFIDEB), and households’ debt-to-GDP (HOUDEB), constructed from data 
obtained from the European Central Bank Statistics. In particular, we use the statistics 
corresponding to the Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) balance sheets in each euro 
country.  Thus, household debt corresponds to the total loans to households from 
MFIs. To isolate it from the intermediation effect that would inflate debt ratios, banks’ 
debt is constructed by subtracting M3, banks’ remaining liabilities and banks’ capital 
and reserves from total MFI liabilities17. And non-financial corporation debt is built up 
by adding non-financial corporation securities to total loans to non-financial 
corporations from MFIs18. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Table 6 shows that after the subprime crisis in August 2007, not only does the government level 
of indebtedness increase in the euro area (the ratio over the GDP achieves levels of 143%, 119%, 
96%, 93% and 63% at the end of December 2010 in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, 
respectively) but private borrowing also registers a sizeable increase. In particular, as can be 
observed, at the end of 2010, banks’ debt-to-GDP is huge in Ireland (729%), but is also high in 
Portugal, Spain and Greece (182%, 159% and 98%). On the other hand, households’ debt-to-
GDP surpasses the 80% threshold in Ireland, Portugal and Spain, whilst non-financial 
corporations’ debt-to-GDP is close to 90% in Portugal and Spain and around 70% in Ireland. 
                                                 
17 The banks’ debt variable we have constructed avoids the effects of intermediation, even though it can 
only be considered as an approximation of its real value, and some caveats are in order: specifically, some 
deposits will appear as debt (those not included in M3) and some debt securities will not be considered debt 
(those included in M3). 
18 Non-financial corporations’ (NFCs) debt should also include “net equity of households” (liabilities of NFCs 
from direct pension commitments to their employees). Nevertheless, we have ignored this variable since it 
was not available for all the countries in the sample. 
 
 18
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Thus, during the period 2007-2010, whereas the government debt-to-GDP ratio registers the 
highest increases compared to the period 2002-2006 in Ireland, Portugal and Greece (39%, 15% 
and 9%), there is a much steeper rise in the banks’ debt-to-GDP ratio which is higher than 150% 
in Greece, close to 70% in Ireland, around 64% in Spain and close to 40% in Portugal. Besides, 
households’ debt-to-GDP ratio registers an increase close to 30% in Greece, close to 20% in 
Ireland and Spain and around 15% in Italy, whilst non-financial corporations’ debt-to-GDP ratio 
rises close to 30%, 25% and 20% in Ireland, Spain and Greece respectively. 
 
Following Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Allen et al. (2011), in our analysis we include variables 
that capture the important cross-border banking system linkages in euro area countries. These 
cross-border banking linkages are measured using the consolidated claims on an immediate 
borrower basis of Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reporting banks in the public, banking 
and non-financial private sectors as a proportion of GDP. 
vi) In particular, we include foreign bank claims on government debt-to-GDP (PUB), on 
bank debt-to-GDP (BAN) and on non-financial private sector debt-to-GDP (PRI). These 
variables are constructed from information provided by the Bank for International 
Settlements and the OECD. 
vii) Moreover, we explore the role of consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis 
provided by BIS by nationality of reporting banks as a proportion of total foreign claims 
on each country. This variable is denoted as XXYYBAN, meaning the percentage of 
country XX’s foreign claims held by country YY’s banks. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The figures in Table 7 underline the fact that the causes of the debt crises that led to subsequent 
rescues in Europe varied substantially according to country. Greek fiscal deficit and public debt to 
GDP were close to 15% and 130% at the end of 2009 as a result of chronic macroeconomic 
imbalances. Besides, on average, foreign banks’ claims on its public sector debt represented 
around 30% of its GDP during the period 2005-2010. Conversely, in Ireland, the crisis was mainly 
due to the private sector, particularly the domestic housing boom which was financed by foreign 
borrowing. In particular, the amount of bank and non-financial enterprise debt claimed by foreign 
banks is huge during the period 2005-2010 (102% and 216% of its GDP, on average). Finally, in 
Portugal, markets were mostly worried about the country’s high external debt, specifically, that of 
its non-financial corporations. During the 2005-2010 period, foreign banks’ claims on Portuguese 
enterprises surpassed 40% of the country’s GDP.   
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As stated before, the Bank for International Settlements also provides information about the 
country of origin of the foreign claims. This information is displayed in Table 8. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The information provided in Table 8 is very useful for understanding the channels of contagion of 
debt crises through the banking system. It can be observed that at the end of 2010 French and 
German banks were the most exposed to foreign Greek debt, holding 39.6% and 23.7% of total 
foreign Greek claims respectively. In the case of Ireland, the maximum risk was borne by British 
banks (29.9%) followed by the Germans (26.13%). A Portuguese default would be especially 
harmful for Spanish banks which hold 41.9% of Portuguese banks’ total claims. Finally, around 
45% of Spanish and Italian foreign claims are held by French and German banks.      
 
Finally, as we above mentioned, we also introduce an instrument that might capture investor 
behavior-based reasons of contagion.  
 
viii) We use the credit rating as a proxy of the default risk (RAT). Standard &Poor’s, Moody’s 
and Fitch ratings for each government’s debt are compiled from Bloomberg. Following 
Blanco (2001), we build up a scale to gauge the effect of investor sentiment based on the 
rating offered by the three agencies19. 
 
3.3. Empirical results 
Given that the instruments used as dependent variables are published each month, we need to 
compute the dependent variable in the probit models on a monthly basis. To do so, we first assign 
a value of 1 to the daily observation if the time-varying causality indicator is greater than its 
average plus two standard errors. In the second step, we compute the monthly data by averaging 
the daily observation and assigning a value of 1 if the resulting monthly average is greater than 
0.5 (i. e., if at least for half of the month there is evidence of contagion).  
 
In Table 9 we report the results of the probit models estimated by maximum likelihood for the 
sample period March 2005 to March 201020. The z-statistics in that table are based on robust 
standard errors computed using the Huber-White quasi-maximum likelihood method.   
                                                 
19 By construction, the higher the scale, the worse the rating categories. 
20 The reduction in the sample period is imposed by the availability of data regarding the consolidated 
claims of Bank for International Settlements’ reporting banks on each sector. 
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[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
The analysis of the coefficient values is complicated by the fact that coefficients estimated from a 
binary model cannot be interpreted as the marginal effect on the dependent variable. 
Nevertheless, the direction of the effect of a change in any instrument depends only on the sign of 
the coefficient estimated: positive values imply that an increase in a given instrument will raise the 
probability of contagion, while negative values indicate the opposite. 
 
Interestingly, the variable XXYYBAN is statistically significant in all cases; suggesting that, in a 
scenario of increased cross-border financial activity in the euro area, contagion of the crisis in one 
country to other countries through the banking system can be a major issue.  
 
Regarding the measures of the country’s fiscal position, our results indicate that both GOVDEB 
and DEF are key determinants of the probability of a contagion episode. As for the instruments 
used to gauge the level of competitiveness of a given country, our estimations suggest that both 
CAC and INF are statistically significant with the expected sign. In particular, they are extremely 
useful when explaining the contagion from Greece, Spain and Portugal. In relation to the variables 
used to capture the country’s growth potential, we find a positive influence for U and a negative 
effect for LEA and GRO, suggesting that the stronger the economy, the lower the probability of 
contagion in debt markets. This conclusion is particularly relevant in the case of Greece, Italy and 
Portugal. 
 
With regard to the role of private debt, we find empirical evidence supporting its importance in the 
cases of Spain and Italy. Interestingly, this variable is not significant in the case of Ireland, even 
though some authors have claimed that it was the main cause of the debt crisis in this country. 
Nevertheless, we detect a major effect of foreign bank claims on banking and non-financial private 
sector debt-to-GDP on the probability of contagion from Ireland. This finding seems to underline 
the dependence of Ireland’s domestic expansion on foreign borrowing. 
 
Finally, as regards the impact of investor sentiment, the credit rating scale seems to be an 
important determinant in six out of the 20 cases considered.  
 
In Table 9 we report the McFadden R-squared as a measure of goodness of the fit. As can be 
seen, it ranges from 0.5595 to 0.8388, suggesting the relative success of the probit regression 
models in predicting the values of the dependent variable within the sample. As a further test to 
evaluate how well our estimated probit models fit the observations, we compute the fitted 
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probability both within-sample and out-of-sample. Recall that when generating our contagion 
indicator, we left out nine observations (April to December 2010) that were not used in the 
estimation. This allows us to evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the estimated probit 
models based on the actual evolution of the instrumental variables.  Figure 3 reports the results. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
As can be seen, the fitted probabilities closely track the evolution of the observed within-sample 
probabilities. Regarding the out-of-sample probabilities, our results suggest the occurrence of an 
additional contagion episode in the last months of 2010 coinciding with a period of renewed 
turbulence in European debt markets. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper presents a dynamic approach to the analysis of the evolution of the degree of causality 
and contagion between peripheral EMU public debt markets (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain). To this end, we have (1) tested for the existence of possible causal relationships between 
the evolution of the yield of these countries’ issues, (2) examined the time-varying nature of these 
causal relationships to detect episodes of contagion between them, and (3) analyzed the 
determinants of these contagion events. 
 
It seems increasingly clear that the origin of sovereign debt crisis in Europe has gone beyond the 
imbalances in public finances and that there is also an obvious interconnection between public 
and private debt. As a result, we have analyzed the role of this interconnection in the episodes of 
contagion by using a unique dataset on private debt-to-GDP by sector (households, banks and 
non-financial corporations) in each peripheral EMU country. Besides, since the reasons for 
contagion can be fundamental-based or investor behavior-based, we have included instruments 
that capture both types. In addition, we have borne in mind that fundamental-based contagion 
works not only through real linkages, but also through financial linkages across countries. 
Specifically, in the current scenario of increased cross-border financial activity in the euro area, 
special attention has been paid to the impact of the degree of integration of the banking system 
on the speed at which a sovereign crisis in a country can spill over to others. This channel of 
contagion has generally been ignored by the recent literature, but its relevance is crucial.  
 
The main results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the results of the rolling 
analysis we apply in order to explore the dynamic causality between peripheral EMU yields 
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suggest that there exist sub-periods of Granger causality in all pair-wise relationships. Given the 
absence of consensus in the literature on how contagion should be defined, we have identified 
contagion episodes as sub-periods of significant increase in causality. Hence, our empirical 
evidence suggests that these episodes are concentrated around the first year of the launch of the 
EMU in 1999, the introduction of euro coins and banknotes in 2002 and the global financial crisis 
in the late-2000s. Our results also indicate that the causality relationships between peripheral 
EMU yields have been significantly reinforced during the recent crises in sovereign debt markets 
since 2009, providing evidence of an increase in the contagion between them. 
 
Secondly, the results of the probit models estimated to analyze the determinants of the previously 
detected contagion episodes indicate that in all cases the variable that captures cross-border 
banking linkages is statistically significant. This finding suggests that, in a scenario of increased 
international financial activity in the euro area, contagion of the crisis in one country to other 
countries through the banking system may be an important issue. It is important to recall that 
macroeconomic imbalances in a specific country (the instruments we have used to capture them 
also indicate that they are key determinants of the probability of occurrence of a contagion 
episode) lead to rising sovereign spreads and a devaluation of the government debt that is 
mirrored in banks’ balance sheets. Lastly, regarding the role of private debt, we find evidence of 
its importance in the cases of Spain and Italy. However, we detect a major effect of foreign bank 
claims on banking and non-financial private sector debt-to-GDP on the probability of contagion 
from Ireland, which seems to underline the dependence of Ireland’s domestic boom on foreign 
borrowing. 
 
In the current context of uncertainty in European sovereign debt markets, the analysis presented 
in this paper deals with a subject that has not been addressed in sufficient depth by the literature 
and is of particular relevance both to academics and to policy-makers. 
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ANNEX 
 
Figure 1a. Daily 10-year sovereign yields in peripheral EMU countries: 1999-2010 
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Figure 1b. Daily 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany: 1999-2010 
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Figure 2: FPE sequence from rolling regressions 
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Figure 3: Probit results 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Levels     
  GR IE IT PT SP 
 Mean 4.995 4.543 4.491 4.541 4.379 
 Median 4.544 4.459 4.374 4.405 4.232 
 Maximum 12.440 9.012 5.879 7.104 5.870 
 Minimum 3.206 3.038 3.215 2.997 3.025 
 Std. Dev. 1.637 0.828 0.615 0.722 0.650 
 Skewness 2.714 1.236 0.343 0.423 0.376 
 Kurtosis 10.589 7.304 2.268 2.793 2.230 
 Jarque-Bera 9468.5 3213.9 131.5 99.0 151.2 
 Observations 2610 3131 3131 3131 3131 
Panel B: First differences       
  DGR DIE DIT DPT DSP 
 Mean 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Maximum 1.304 0.682 0.213 0.546 0.253 
 Minimum -4.323 -1.028 -0.319 -1.470 -0.441 
 Std. Dev. 0.117 0.058 0.041 0.062 0.044 
 Skewness -17.879 -1.162 0.181 -4.230 -0.077 
 Kurtosis 720.496 48.784 5.562 113.490 7.960 
 Jarque-Bera 56102048.0 274076.8 873.0 1601451.0 3211.0 
 Observations 2609 3130 3130 3130 3130 
 
Note: In all tables GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
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Table 2. Augmented Dickey- Fuller tests for unit roots. 
Panel A: I (2) versus I (1) 
 ττ τµ τ 
DGR -17.8072* -17.6380* -17.5929* 
DIE -47.7382* -47.7020* -47.6802* 
DIT -52.3394* -52.3468* -52.3535* 
DPT -31.6051* -31.5955* -31.5838* 
DSP -51.8722* -51.8773* -51.8802* 
Panel B: I (1) versus I (0) 
 ττ τµ τ 
GR 0.2766 1.2043 1.5440 
IE 0.3425 0.3400 1.3145 
IT -2.6923 -2.0867 0.0225 
PT -1.0206 -1.2202 0.6855 
SP -1.8358 -1.7678 0.2859 
Notes:  
The ADF statistic is a test for the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
ττ, τμ and τ denote the ADF statistics with drift and trend, with drift, and without drift, respectively.  
* denotes significance at the 1% level. Critical values based on MacKinnon (1996) 
 
Table 3. KPSS tests for stationarity 
Panel A: I (2) versus I (1) 
  ττ τµ 
DGR  0.1052 0.2574 
DIE  0.0877 0.3287 
DIT  0.1083 0.1072 
DPT  0.1103 0.1868 
DSP  0.0975 0.1551 
Panel B: I (1) versus I (0) 
  ττ τµ 
GR  0.9832* 1.8948* 
IE  1.1606* 1.1528* 
IT  0.6825* 2.9237* 
PT  0.9373* 1.6140* 
SP  0.8374* 3.0079* 
Notes:  
The KPSS statistic is a test for the null hypothesis of stationarity. 
ττ and τμ denote the KPSS statistics with drift and trend, and with drift, respectively.  
* denotes significance at the 1% level. Asymptotic critical values based on Kwiatkowski et al. (1992. Table 
1) 
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Table 4. Cointegration tests 
 Hypothesized numbers 
of  cointegrating 
relations 
Trace statistica 
 
p-valueb 
GR. IE None 
At most one  
20.3839** 
1.0135 
0.0481 
0.9498 
GR. IT None 
At most one  
16.5832 
3.0084 
0.1488 
0.5791 
GR. PT None 
At most one  
21.0916** 
2.8721 
0.0384 
0.6049 
GR. SP None 
At most one  
14.7411 
2.6170 
0.2416 
0.6544 
IE. IT None 
At most one  
12.6781 
1.2744 
0.3901 
0.9118 
IE. PT None 
At most one  
10.2764 
1.7622 
0.6127 
0.8244 
IE. SP None 
At most one  
9.67O6 
1.0393 
0.6721 
0.9464 
IT. PT None 
At most one  
9.2582 
1.8854 
0.7119 
0.8004 
IT. SP None 
At most one  
13.5751 
2.7382 
0.3197 
0.6307 
PT. SP None 
At most one  
15.5181 
2.9255 
0.1981 
0.5947 
 
Notes:  a * and ** denote rejection of the hypothesis at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.   
            b MacKinnon et al. (1999)’s p-values. 
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Table 5. FPE statistics for the whole sample 
 
 FPE(m.0)x10-3 FPE(m.n) x10-3 Causality 
GR →  IE 3.4311 (1.0) 3.3972 (1.1) Yes 
  IE   → GR 13.1864 (4.0) 12.8586 (4.4) Yes 
GR →  IT 1.6707 (1.0) 1.6695 (1.1) Yes 
 IT  →  GR 13.1864 (4.0) 13.0770 (4.1) Yes 
 GR →  PT 3.5423 (4.0) 3.5096 (4.1) Yes 
 PT →  GR 13.1864 (4.0) 12.6075 (4.4) Yes 
GR → SP 1.9055 (4.0) 1.9063 (4.1) No 
 SP  → GR 13.1864 (4.0) 13.1102 (4.4) Yes 
IE  →  IT 1.6910 (1.0) 1.6586 (1.1) Yes 
IT  →  IE 3.2584 (1.0) 3.2596 (1.1) Yes 
IE  →  PT 3.8007 (4.0) 3.6855 (4.1) Yes 
PT →  IE 3.2584 (1.0) 3.2602 (1.1) No 
IE  →  SP 1.9248 (4.0) 1.8941 (4.1) Yes 
SP →  IE 3.2584 (1.0) 1.9248 (1.4) Yes 
IT  → PT 3.8007 (4.0) 3.7989 (4.1) Yes 
PT → IT 1.6910 (1.0) 1.6812 (1.1) Yes 
IT  → SP 1.9248 (4.0) 1.9214 (4.1) Yes 
SP  → IT 1.6910 (1.0) 1.6878 (1.1) Yes 
PT  → SP 1.9248 (4.0) 1.9183 (4.1) Yes 
SP  → PT 3.8007 (4.0) 3.7832 (4.11) Yes 
Note: The figures in brackets are the optimum order of lags in each pair of countries 
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Table 6. Debt-to-GDP by sector 
Note: Debt-to-GDP at the end of each year.   
GREECE 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) Average 2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks  24.6 26.0 25.5 28.4 33.7 48.4 63.2 68.5 97.6 27.6 69.4 151% 
Households  19.5 22.6 27.0 32.6 37.0 40.4 40.8 41.5 59.9 35.7 45.6 28% 
Non-financial corporations  32.6 33.2 34.0 37.5 39.0 43.1 50.9 48.0 53.0 41.3 48.8 18% 
General Government  101.7 97.4 98.9 109.0 106.4 105.4 110.7 127.1 142.8 111.0 121.5 9% 
IRELAND 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) Average 2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks  287.1 329.0 399.3 491.9 579.6 609.7 726.1 753.6 729.1 417.4 704.6 69% 
Households  43.9 48.5 60.9 70.9 77.8 81.2 84.8 92.3 89.5 72.2 86.9 20% 
Non-financial corporations  40.2 44.0 55.4 63.6 79.9 91.3 105.9 107.2 72.0 73.3 94.1 28% 
General Government  30.7 31.0 29.5 27.4 24.8 25.0 44.4 65.6 96.2 41.6 57.8 39% 
ITALY 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) Average 2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks  65.5 69.4 71.9 77.1 85.6 94.1 104.1 105.9 104.3 73.9 102.1 38% 
Households  21.5 23.0 25.1 27.0 28.5 29.8 30.3 32.7 38.1 28.4 32.7 15% 
Non-financial corporations  44.4 46.4 47.4 48.0 51.7 56.8 60.9 61.7 62.3 53.3 60.4 13% 
General Government  105.7 104.4 103.9 105.9 106.6 103.6 106.3 116.1 119.0 107.9 111.3 3% 
PORTUGAL 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) Average 2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks  106.3 113.3 101.6 103.8 115.3 126.4 136.6 156.3 182.5 108.1 150.4 39% 
Households  59.3 58.6 60.4 64.5 70.7 74.5 78.3 81.7 82.3 70.0 79.2 13% 
Non-financial corporations  68.2 67.9 67.2 70.8 72.7 78.7 90.8 93.0 90.6 77.8 88.3 14% 
General Government  53.8 55.9 57.6 62.8 69.5 68.3 71.6 83.0 93.0 68.4 79.0 15% 
SPAIN 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) Average 2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks  72.4 78.5 84.7 107.3 116.9 133.7 150.1 161.4 159.2 92.0 151.1 64% 
Households  47.5 51.1 55.8 66.4 74.2 78.3 81.9 83.5 82.1 69.0 81.4 18% 
Non-financial corporations  47.1 49.6 53.8 63.0 76.3 85.5 91.2 90.4 87.0 71.6 88.5 24% 
General Government  52.5 48.7 46.2 43.0 39.6 36.1 39.8 53.3 60.1 46.6 47.3 2% 
Source: Eurostat, Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) balance sheets obtained from the European 
Central Bank and authors’ estimates. 
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Table 7. Foreign banks’ claims on individual countries-to-GDP by sector. 
Foreign banks’ claims on public sector debt/GDP         
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
GREECE 30.79 33.64 36.07 30.56 29.93 17.64 29.77 
IRELAND 4.78 6.19 7.56 8.37 15.19 11.69 8.96 
ITALY 20.59 21.55 23.24 21.45 24.05 13.07 20.66 
PORTUGAL 19.47 22.03 20.61 20.60 24.00 12.68 19.90 
SPAIN 8.46 8.86 8.16 7.50 9.21 6.73 8.15 
Foreign banks’ claims on banks debt/GDP         
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
GREECE 6.23 7.02 10.04 12.17 10.33 3.55 8.23 
IRELAND 103.93 120.21 140.62 100.51 92.71 51.09 101.51 
ITALY 10.85 12.87 14.97 11.03 9.46 7.38 11.09 
PORTUGAL 15.77 19.14 23.58 19.71 21.08 15.88 19.19 
SPAIN 16.72 20.78 26.61 23.51 23.03 14.91 20.93 
Foreign banks’ claims on non-financial private sector debt/GDP     
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
GREECE 16.73 27.42 35.73 36.01 26.07 26.22 28.03 
IRELAND 133.91 177.50 251.16 269.12 252.07 213.98 216.29 
ITALY 11.60 20.67 28.28 23.07 24.97 22.83 21.90 
PORTUGAL 32.12 38.35 46.84 46.22 49.83 45.57 43.15 
SPAIN 17.38 25.38 33.61 29.83 30.52 25.09 26.97 
 
Note: Reliance on foreign bank financing is measured by the consolidated claims on an immediate 
borrower basis of Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reporting banks on each sector (public, banks 
and non-financial corporations as a proportion of GDP). Data correspond to the end of each year.  
Source: This table has been constructed from data collected from Table 9C of BIS Quarterly Review: June 
2011 and the OECD. 
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Table 8.  Claims by nationality of reporting banks as a proportion of total foreign claims. 
GREECE 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 3.3 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.5 
Belgian banks 8.7 5.6 5.7 3.8 2.0 1.3 4.5 
Finnish banks 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
French banks 9.4 19.1 24.4 28.4 36.7 39.6 26.2 
German banks 22.0 18.1 15.9 14.5 20.9 23.7 19.2 
Irish banks 0.0 5.6 3.6 3.2 4.0 0.6 2.8 
Italian banks 2.2 0.0 4.3 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.7 
Dutch banks 11.3 8.8 7.9 4.9 5.7 3.5 7.0 
Portuguese banks 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.4 4.6 7.2 3.5 
Spanish banks 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 
British banks 5.4 4.6 5.5 4.8 7.1 9.8 6.2 
US banks 5.0 4.1 3.4 2.6 7.7 5.1 4.6 
Others 30.3 28.7 24.0 29.3 5.4 3.3 20.2 
IRELAND 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 1.22 1.39 1.16 0.76 1.27 0.64 1.1 
Belgian banks 8.82 10.52 8.42 6.75 5.68 5.62 7.6 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.0 
French banks 7.30 9.06 12.02 10.10 8.47 6.55 8.9 
German banks 25.78 23.95 25.90 29.97 29.88 26.13 26.9 
Greek banks 0.22 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.1 
Italian banks 3.71 2.96 3.43 3.62 2.83 2.99 3.3 
Dutch banks 9.92 7.49 5.69 5.25 4.58 3.70 6.1 
Portuguese banks 0.52 0.75 0.40 0.56 0.76 1.14 0.7 
Spanish banks 3.11 3.81 3.04 2.20 2.38 2.22 2.8 
British banks 26.49 26.91 26.21 28.22 27.12 29.91 27.5 
US banks 3.15 3.97 4.51 4.89 9.28 11.27 6.2 
Others 9.77 9.07 9.15 7.63 7.67 9.57 8.8 
PORTUGAL 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 1.39 1.31 1.09 1.11 1.15 0.81 1.1 
Belgian banks 5.14 6.65 4.77 5.28 2.33 1.75 4.3 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.0 
French banks 10.28 10.55 13.79 13.11 17.83 13.33 13.1 
German banks 20.64 19.27 20.05 19.50 18.79 18.03 19.4 
Greek banks 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.0 
Irish banks 0.00 4.30 3.62 2.78 2.16 1.35 2.4 
Italian banks 3.18 3.83 3.39 2.72 2.66 2.01 3.0 
Dutch banks 7.45 6.66 7.39 6.07 5.61 3.24 6.1 
Spanish banks 35.12 31.99 32.23 33.93 33.71 41.89 34.8 
British banks 11.17 8.68 8.55 9.62 10.20 12.05 10.0 
US banks 1.64 2.26 1.51 0.81 1.85 2.61 1.8 
Others 3.98 4.50 3.60 5.05 3.66 2.70 3.9 
SPAIN 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 0.86 0.87 0.82 0.87 0.96 0.95 0.9 
Belgian banks 4.22 4.52 4.44 4.82 2.46 3.06 3.9 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.0 
French banks 18.25 14.94 18.92 19.35 22.97 20.01 19.1 
German banks 26.51 30.07 29.23 27.83 25.89 25.88 27.6 
Greek banks 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.0 
Irish banks 0.00 3.86 3.84 3.70 3.45 2.13 2.8 
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Italian banks 2.49 2.34 2.70 3.12 3.39 4.22 3.0 
Dutch banks 16.87 13.95 13.36 13.69 13.02 10.94 13.6 
Portugal banks 2.61 2.84 2.77 3.14 3.14 3.80 3.0 
British banks 15.23 13.84 12.55 13.66 11.98 15.25 13.8 
US banks 4.55 4.72 4.12 3.67 6.31 6.72 5.0 
Others 8.35 8.02 7.25 6.12 6.37 6.78 7.1 
ITALY 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 2.64 2.19 2.04 1.61 2.23 2.58 2.2 
Belgian banks 10.85 8.09 4.38 4.74 2.83 2.99 5.6 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.0 
French banks 18.94 27.45 37.66 42.79 44.44 45.53 36.1 
German banks 25.26 20.10 19.41 18.91 16.60 18.82 19.9 
Greek banks 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.1 
Irish banks 0.00 5.20 3.94 4.25 3.99 1.53 3.2 
Dutch banks 10.84 13.82 11.65 6.11 6.04 5.26 9.0 
Portuguese banks 0.76 0.75 0.41 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.5 
Spanish banks 4.44 2.99 2.82 4.44 4.13 3.62 3.7 
British banks 9.22 7.02 7.09 6.83 6.71 7.70 7.4 
US banks 5.78 3.25 2.79 2.33 4.66 4.26 3.8 
Others 11.12 9.08 7.78 7.65 7.84 7.21 8.4 
Note: Table 8 displays the consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis of Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) by nationality of reporting banks as a proportion of total foreign claims on each country. 
Data correspond to the end of each year.  
Source: This table has been constructed from data collected from Table 9D of BIS Quarterly Review: June 
2011. 
Table 9: Probit models 
Greece → Ireland 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
GRIEBAN 19.4772 2.5471 
GRGOVDEB -0.0607 -2.2599 
GROGR -0.1322 -2.1527 
DEFIE 0.1165 2.0749 
IEBAN -0.0312 -2.2786 
IEPRI 0.0196 2.1867 
GRBANDEB 0.1266 2.2458 
McFadden R-squared 0.7386    
 Ireland → Greece 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -2.8012 -2.0634 
IEGRBAN 91.6240 2.9967 
IEPUB 1.2065 2.9655 
DEFIE 0.0926 2.2747 
McFadden R-squared 0.7198    
Greece → Italy 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant 165.0794 2.1985 
GRITBAN 3.5560 2.2579 
INFGR 4.580 3.672 
GROGR -6.3392 -3.4648 
RATGR 1.2271 -2.0386 
GRGOVDEB 0.8118 -2.1946 
McFadden R-squared 0.8058    
Italy → Greece  
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -177.6220 -2.7693 
ITGRBAN 3.8020 2.5559 
DEFIT 0.6852 2.4742 
ITBANDEB 0.0458 2.5783 
LEAIT -0.428 -2.6075 
RATGRE 4.0481 3.8010 
ITPUB 2.7413 2.6193 
ITHOUDEB 6.1249 2.9754 
McFadden R-squared 0.7341    
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 Greece → Portugal 
Coefficient   z-Statistic 
Contant -3.1133 -2.1357 
GRPTBAN 53.5999 2.5940 
INFGR 2.3869 2.1412 
UGR 7.7531 2.7749 
GRGOVDEB 0.8771 3.4462 
VARRATPT 5.8638 3.9751 
GRNFIDEB 1.1808 3.9503 
GRPUB 1.6704 2.6380 
GRPRI 0.8294 3.4910 
McFadden R-squared 0.8474    
 Portugal → Greece 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -96.3741 -4.2545 
PTGRBAN 5.9734 3.3352 
INFPT 3.2890 3.9156 
UPT 8.1793 4.2537 
DEFPT 0.3027 2.3217 
PTNFIDEB 1.3158 2.7293 
PTPUB 0.5964 2.3633 
PTBANDEB 0.9296 2.6373 
McFadden R-squared 0.7386    
Greece → Spain 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -6.2095 -1.4073 
GRSPBAN 7.2864 2.4876 
UGR 4.1365 5.5873 
GRGOVDEB 0.3101 4.3304 
DEFSP 0.2693 2.5897 
McFadden R-squared 0.8125   
 
 
Spain → Greece 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -99.4167 -4.1675 
SPGRBAN 33.1269 3.9718 
SPBANDEB 0.3791 2.5198 
SPANFIDEB 0.1302 2.4135 
RATGR 1.3577 2.6305 
RATSP 5.6458 2.6104 
CACSP 1.1596 2.4870 
SPPUB 10.1523 3.2375 
McFadden R-squared 0.7093    
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Spain → Portugal 
Coefficient   z-Statistic 
Constant -40.6506 -2.8468 
SPPTBAN 6.9212 2.1449 
SPNFIDEB 2.6210 3.2914 
UPOR 3.1901 2.7406 
McFadden R-squared 0.6611   
 
 
 Portugal → Spain 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
PTSPBAN 12.1144 2.5430 
DEFPT 0.3725 2.1648 
GROPT -13.9959 -2.6106 
INFPT -6.6052 -2.3755 
VARRATPT 0.2782 2.2489 
GROSP 12.8877 2.6820 
SPGOVDEB -1.1445 -2.5831 
McFadden R-squared 0.8088    
Spain → Italy 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant 18.1615 2.1399 
SPITBAN 4.7558 2.3862 
DEFSP 0.2929 2.1964 
LEASP -3.4998 -2.8219 
SPGOVDEB 1.9947 2.4978 
CACSP -2.5224 -2.8436 
LEAIT 2.8028 2.2771 
ITPUB 3.1219 2.1977 
RATIT 2.4639 2.2641 
McFadden R-squared 0.6269    
Italy → Spain  
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -27.3744 -2.0622 
ITSPBAN 2.8219 2.0290 
DEFIT 0.5317 2.1852 
ITBANDEB 0.3654 2.2033 
LEAIT -0.2687 2.8245 
RATSP 10.2186 3.2582 
ITGOVDEB 0.1419 2.5303 
UIT 6.9282 2.8391 
McFadden R-squared 0.7466    
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Italy → Ireland 
Coefficient   z-Statistic 
Constant 69.3280 3.1186 
ITIEBAN 6.2755 3.4121 
DEFIT 0.0083 2.0548 
ITBANDEB 0.3962 3.5773 
LEAIT -0.9472 4.1862 
RATIE 5.5569 4.6048 
ITHOUDEB 1.4920 2.8739 
ITGOVDEB 0.5991 3.5876 
McFadden R-squared 0.6557    
 Ireland → Italy 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -34.7139 -3.7590 
IEITBAN 0.0110 2.0619 
IEPUB 4.9328 3.8503 
DEFIE 0.3727 3.0778 
INFIE 1.6927 3.5820 
McFadden R-squared 0.8173    
Portugal → Ireland 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant 5.8309 2.3371 
PTIEBAN 53.9490 2.5308 
DEFPT 1.3717 3.1335 
GROPT -1.3577 -2.6080 
INFPT 1.8180 2.0768 
RATPT 0.8849 2.4420 
GROIE -0.2628 -2.4346 
IEGOVDEB 0.0779 2.2206 
McFadden R-squared 0.7313    
Ireland → Portugal 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -103.6540 -4.7475 
IEPTBAN 1.0914 2.9016 
IEPUB 2.1862 2.8636 
DEFIE 0.7100 3.1511 
LEAIE -2.9091 -4.4582 
IEBAN 0.2298 2.4472 
IEGOVDEB 1.9663 2.9986 
UPT 5.5731 2.3205 
CACPT -6.9992 -4.8327 
McFadden R-squared 0.8195    
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Spain → Ireland 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant 98.8600 2.8023 
SPIEBAN 1.2292 2.1407 
DEFSP 0.0476 2.8906 
LEASP 1.2608 3.1738 
SPBAN 2.1513 2.9228 
SPGOVDEB 2.2618 3.0030 
CACSP -0.6272 -2.1229 
GROIE -0.7570 -3.7996 
SPBANDEB 0.3240 2.7109 
McFadden R-squared 0.6750    
 Ireland → Spain 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -4.4028 -2.6272 
IESPBAN 0.3133 2.6764 
IEPUB 1.7950 3.1077 
DEFIE 0.4638 3.2044 
IEBAN 0.0749 3.1281 
IEGOVDEB 1.0637 3.1027 
USP 2.2242 2.9601 
McFadden R-squared 0.7045    
Portugal → Italy 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -59.3698 -4.0692 
PTITBAN 4.8112 2.4425 
DEFPT 0.4549 2.2626 
UPT 2.5365 2.1736 
RATPT 7.2804 3.9456 
UIT 2.5939 3.0013 
PTPUB 1.8024 4.2752 
RATIT 1.0716 2.6486 
PTGOVDEB 0.7401 3.3067 
McFadden R-squared 0.5595    
Italy → Portugal 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant 28.0712 2.0045 
ITPTBAN 6.8975 3.3487 
DEFIT 0.6021 2.5329 
UIT 3.5979 2.8359 
UPT 5.7698 2.7683 
ITHOUDEB 2.7336 3.2757 
RATIT 1.3327 2.1908 
ITGOVDEB 1.3677 3.2470 
McFadden R-squared 0.7383    
 
Note: 
CACXX = Current-account-balance-to-GDP of country XX 
LEAXX = Leading indicator index rate of growth of country XX 
GROXX = GDP (constant prices) rate of growth of country XX 
UXX = Unemployment rate of country XX 
INFXX = Inflation rate of country XX 
RATXX = Credit rating scale of country XX. 
DEFXX = Government deficit-to-GDP of country XX. 
XXGOVDEB = Government debt-to-GDP of country XX. 
XXBANDEB = Bank debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXNFIDEB = Non-financial corporations debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXHOUDEB = Households debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXBAN = Foreign bank claims on banks debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXPUB = Foreign bank claims on government debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXPRI = Foreign bank claims on non-financial private debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXYYBAN = Percentage of country XX’s foreign claims held by country YY’s banks 
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